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Abstract
We show whether central clearing of a particular class of derivatives lowers
counterparty risk. For plausible cases, adding a central clearing counterparty
(CCP) for a class of derivatives such as credit default swaps reduces netting
e±ciency, leading to an increase in average exposure to counterparty default.
Clearing two or more di®erent classes of derivatives in separate CCPs always in-
creases counterparty exposures relative to clearing the combined set of derivatives
in a single CCP.
¤Du±e: du±e@stanford.edu. Zhu: haoxiang.zhu@stanford.edu. Address for correspondence: 518 Memo-
rial Way, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. We are extremely grateful
for comments from James Aitken, Mark Carey, John Cochrane, John Coleman, Douglas Diamond, Athanas-
sios Diplas, Rob Engle, Stephen Figlewski, Ken French, Jason Granet, Erik Heit¯eld, Daniel Heller, Edward
Kane, Thorsten Koeppl, Lasse Heje Pedersen, Myron Scholes, Andreas SchÄ onenberger, Manmohan Singh,
George Pennacchi, Craig Pirrong (discussant), Fabien Renault (discussant), Daniela Russo, Roger Stein,
Ren¶ e Stulz, Christian Upper, Anne Wetherilt, Andrew White, Alex Yavorsky, and seminar participants
at NBER Summer Institute, the Yale-RFS conference on ¯nancial crisis, and the ECB-BoE Workshop on
Central Counterparties, as well as research assistance from Fang Liu.
1A central clearing counterparty (CCP) stands between over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives counterparties, insulating them from each other’s default. Eﬀective
clearing mitigates systemic risk by lowering the risk that defaults propagate from
counteparty to counterparty. Clearing also reduces the degree to which the sol-
vency problems of a market participant are suddenly compounded by a ﬂight of
its OTC derivative counterparties, as occurred when Bear Stearns’ solvency was
threatened.
We show whether central clearing for a particular class of derivatives reduces
counterparty exposures and collateral demands. For plausible cases, adding a
new CCP dedicated to only one class of derivatives, such as credit default swaps
(CDS), reduces netting eﬃciency, thereby increasing average exposure to coun-
terparty default, or increasing collateral demand, or both.
We show that it is always more eﬃcient to have a single CCP that jointly clears
various classes of derivative than to have separate CCPs that clear the respective
classes. For example, regarding the debate over whether dealers should have
separate CCPs for their U.S. and European credit default swaps,1 we show that it
is more eﬃcient to clear U.S. and European credit derivatives contracts on a single
CCP. Of the current proposed and approved CDS central clearing counterparties,
two are based in the United States, while four are based in Europe.2
Our results are based on a simple model, but clarify an important trade-
oﬀ between two types of netting opportunities: bilateral netting between pairs
of counterparties across diﬀerent underlying assets, versus multilateral netting
1See, for example, European Central Bank (2009).
2U.S.-approved CCPs for CDS are those of the ICE Trust and the CME Group. The Europe-based
CCPs (and proposals) include those of NYSE-LIFFE/BClear and LCH.Clearnet, Eurex, ICE Trust Europe
(an arm of ICE dedicated to Europe-based CDS clearing), and LCH.Clearnet SA (a French subsidiary of
LCH.Clearnet, dedicated to Eurozone CDS clearing). See European Central Bank (2009) p. 77 for more
details.
2among many clearing participants across a single class of underlying assets, such
as credit default swaps. The introduction of a CCP for a particular class such as
credit derivatives is only eﬀective if the opportunity for multilateral netting in
that class dominates the resulting loss in bilateral netting opportunities across
uncleared derivatives from other asset classes, including uncleared OTC deriatives
for equities, interest rates, commodities, and foreign exchange.
For instance, suppose that Dealer A is exposed to Dealer B by $100 million
on CDS, while at the same time Dealer B is exposed to Dealer A by $150 million
on interest rate swaps. The bilateral exposure is the net, $50 million. The
introduction of central clearing dedicated to CDS eliminates the bilateral netting
beneﬁts and increases the exposure between these two dealers, before collateral,
from $50 million to $150 million. In addition to any collateral posted by Dealer
A to the CCP for CDS, Dealer A would need to post a signiﬁcant amount of
additional collateral to Dealer B. Collateral is a scarce resource, especially in a
credit crisis. The introduction of a CCP for CDS can nevertheless be eﬀective
when there are extensive opportunities for multilateral netting. For example, if
Dealer A is exposed by $100 million to Dealer B through a CDS, while Dealer
B is exposed to Dealer C for $100 million on the same CDS, and Dealer C is
simultaneously exposed to Dealer A for the same amount on the same CDS, then
a CCP eliminates this unnecessary circle of exposures. The introduction of a
CCP therefore involves an important tradeoﬀ between bilateral netting without
the CCP and multilateral netting through the CCP.
Naturally, our results show that introducing a CCP for a particular set of
derivatives reduces average counterparty exposures if and only if the number of
clearing participants is suﬃciently large relative to the exposure on derivatives
that continue to be bilaterally netted. For plausible parameters, we show that it
3is far from obvious that this condition is met for the separate clearing of credit
default swaps.
The beneﬁts of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to credit derivatives
has been signiﬁcantly reduced through the aggressive use of compression trades,
which has lowered exposures in the CDS market to about half of their mid-2008
levels. Proposals by European regulators to have one or more CCPs dedicated
to clearing European credit default swaps could further reduce the netting op-
portunities of a CCP, relative to combining the clearing of CDS in a single CCP.
We provide numerical examples of the impact of this proposal on expected coun-
terparty exposures.
Working with twelve prominent CDS dealers, ICE Trust (U.S.) has cleared
$3.5 trillion notional of index-based CDS contracts in the United States, as of
January 2010.3 According to DTCC data, the total notional amount of standard
index-based and single-name CDS that reference corporations and sovereigns is
currently about $25 trillion. Our results suggest that clearing CDS through
a dedicated central clearing counterparty improves netting eﬃciency for twelve
similarly sized dealers if and only if the fraction of a typical dealer’s total ex-
pected exposure attributable to cleared CDS is at least 66% of the total expected
exposure of remaining bilaterally netted classes of derivatives.
Our results show that a single central clearing counterparty that clears both
credit derivatives and interest rate swaps is likely to oﬀer signiﬁcant reductions in
expected counterparty exposures, even for a relatively small number of clearing
participants. For example, in a simple illustrative calculation based on data pro-
vided by U.S. banks, we show that once 75% of interest rate swaps are cleared,
the incremental reduction in before-collateral average expected counterparty ex-
3See http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=439697.
4posures obtained by clearing 75% of credit derivatives in a separate CCP is
negligible, because of the loss of bilateral netting opportunities. In the same set-
ting, however, clearing these credit derivatives in the same CCP used for interest
rate swaps reduces average expected exposures by about 7%, despite the loss of
bilateral netting opportunities. Relative to the case of fully bilateral netting (no
clearing), substantial beneﬁts can be obtained by the joint clearing of the four
major classes of derivatives monitored by the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the
Currency. Our rough estimates suggest that the joint clearing of 75% of interest
rates swaps and credit derivatives, along with 40% of other derivatives classes,
results in a 37% reduction in pre-collateral expected counterparty exposures,
relative to a market without CCPs. Because we lack direct data on bilateral
counterparty relationships, these estimates are rough approximations.
As we will explain, some important aspects of systemic risk are not captured
by our model. We do not consider the extent to which CCPs mitigate the like-
lihood and severity of knock-on defaults that propagate from the failure of a
large counterparty. An analysis of knock-on defaults would depend in part on
the collateral and guarantees that clearing participants provide to a CCP, as
well as the liquidity resources of all market participants. Modeling the dynam-
ics of knock-on eﬀects is well beyond the reach of currently available methods.
Nevertheless, our results make it clear that regulators and clearing participants
should carefully consider the tradeoﬀs involved in carving oﬀ a particular class of
derivatives for separate clearing. This makes sense, from the viewpoint of coun-
terparty exposures and collateral demands, only if the class of derivatives to be
separately cleared is big enough and if the subset of clearing participants clearing
through the same central clearing counterparty is large enough. So far, proposals
for separate CDS clearing have not made this case eﬀectively. Proposals for a
5number of distinct new CCPs dedicated to credit default swaps raise a particular
concern.
The interoperability of CCPs, by which at least some of the beneﬁts of joint
clearing can be obtained through agreements among CCPs and their participants,
can in principle achieve signiﬁcant reductions in counterparty risk, although ob-
taining eﬀective interoperability agreements currently presents a number of legal
and ﬁnancial engineering challenges, in addition to business-incentive hurdles.
For related discussions of interoperability, see EuroCCP (2010) and Kalogeropou-
los, Russo, and Sch¨ onenberger (2007).
I. Netting Eﬃciency in an OTC Market
We consider N market participants, whom we shall call “entities,” whose over-
the-counter derivative exposures to each other are of concern. These N entities
may also have exposures to other entities.
We consider the opportunity for the N entities to novate some OTC derivative
positions to a central clearing counterparty. For example, if entities i and j have
a CDS position by which i buys protection from j, then both i and j can novate
to a CCP, who is then the seller of protection to i and the buyer of protection
from j. Novation to a CCP is sometimes called “clearing,” although the term
“clearing” is often used in other contexts.4
We allow for K classes of derivatives. These classes could be deﬁned by the
underlying asset classes, such as credit, interest rates, foreign exchange, com-
modities, and equities. One can also construct derivatives classes by grouping
more than one underlying asset type.
4See Bliss and Steigerwald (2006), Pirrong (2009), and Stulz (2009) for discussions of CCPs in the context
of over-the-counter derivatives market.
6For entities i and j, let Xk
ij be the net exposure (when positive) of i to j of all
positions in some derivatives class k, before considering collateral. By deﬁnition,
X
k
ij =  X
k
ji. (1)
Before setting up a CCP, this exposure Xk
ij is uncertain because the level of
exposure that will exist on a typical future day is yet to be determined. The
uncertainty in Xk
ij also includes the risk associated with marks to market that
will occur before additional collateral can be requested and received. If entity j
defaults and Xk
ij > 0, then entity i loses Xk
ij on positions in asset class k, before
considering the beneﬁts of netting across asset classes, collateral, and default
recovery.5
For now, we suppose that all exposures (Xk
ij) are of the same variance and
are independent across asset classes and pairs of entities, excluding the obvious
case represented by (1). We later relax all of these assumptions. For simplicity,
we assume symmetry in the distributions of exposures across all pairs of entities.
This implies in particular that E(Xk
ij) = 0. We will also relax the symmetry
assumption. With N entities and K asset classes, there are K  N  (N   1)/2
exposure distributions to be speciﬁed. Symmetry allows a dramatic reduction in
the dimension of the problem.
A reasonable measure of the netting eﬃciency oﬀered by a market structure
is the average, across entities, of total expected counterparty exposures, after
netting, but before collateral. The lower is this average, the more eﬃcient is the
netting arrangement. Before considering the introduction of a CCP, the netting
5Bliss and Kaufman (2006) provide an analysis of the legal implications of settlement of OTC exposures
at default.
7eﬃciency is
ϕN;K = (N   1)E
[
max
(
K ∑
k=1
X
k
ij,0
)]
, (2)
where we have used symmetry by ﬁxing attention on a particular entity i. As-
suming normality, we have
ϕN;K = (N   1)σ
√
K
2π
, (3)
where σ is the standard deviation of Xk
ij.
For given collateralization standards, the risk of loss caused by a counterparty
default is typically increasing in average expected exposure. (Under normality
and symmetry, essentially any reasonable risk measure is increasing in expected
exposure.) Risk of loss from counterparty default is a ﬁrst-order consideration
for systemic risk analysis.
Going beyond counterparty default risk, as expected exposures go up, the
expected amount of collateral that must be supplied goes up. Collateral use is
expensive. In an OTC market without a CCP, whatever collateral is supplied by
one counterparty is received by another, so the net use of collateral is always zero.
The need to supply collateral is nevertheless onerous, for several reasons. First,
some individual counterparties on a given day will supply more collateral to others
than others supplied to them. The net drain on the assets that could be supplied
as collateral is costly, because of the lost opportunity to use that collateral for
secured borrowing, as a cash management buﬀer, or for securities lending as a
rent-earning business. Second, there is a question of the timing of collateral
settlement. One must often supply collateral to a particular counterparty on a
given day before collateral is received from another counterparty. If this were
8not the case, for instance, there would be no specials in treasury repo markets.
This sort of frictional demand for collateral, analogous to the demand for money
that arises from a limited velocity of circulation of money, is considered by Duﬃe,
Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2002). So long as the average cost of supplying collateral
to others is larger, on average, than the average beneﬁt of receiving collateral from
others, a market with poorer netting eﬃciency is also a market with higher net
cost of collateral use. For a simple illustration, if the amount of collateral to be
supplied is on average some multiple U of exposure, and if the average beneﬁt
b per unit of collateral value received is less than the average cost c per unit
of collateral value supplied, then the average net expected cost to an entity of
collateral usage arising from counterparty exposure is (c b)UϕN;K, where ϕN;K is
the average total expected exposure measure deﬁned above. Under market stress,
collateral demand from derivative counterparties may exacerbate the liquidity
problem of an already-weakened dealer bank, as explained by Duﬃe (2010).
Although average expected exposure, after netting and before collateral, is a
reasonable measure of a market’s netting eﬃciency and is closely related to sys-
temic risk, this measure misses some important aspects of systemic risk. Most
importantly, this measure does not consider the joint determination of defaults
across entities. In particular, as opposed to the joint solvency analysis of Eisen-
berg and Noe (2001), our netting eﬃciency measure does not consider the im-
plications of jointly determined defaults in a network of entities. For example,
the likelihood that entity i cannot cover its payments to j plays a causal role in
determining the likelihood that entity j cannot cover its payments to entity m,
and so on. Adding a CCP could in principle increase or decrease the potential
for jointly determined defaults, depending on the capitalization of the CCP and
of the clearing entities, and on the collateralization standards of bilateral netting
9and central clearing. In addition to the capital that it holds, a CCP is typi-
cally backed by member guarantees. (See the appendix of Duﬃe, Li, and Lubke
(2010).) A full analysis of the implications of a CCP for the joint solvency of its
members is beyond the scope of our research.
In addition to the beneﬁts of a CCP from the viewpoint of netting and of
insulating counterparties from default by each other, a well run central clearing
counterparty can also oﬀer improved and more harmonized trade and collateral
settlement procedures than those that may apply to uncleared derivatives, as
suggested by BIS (2007). The International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) has provided a set of standards for the operational risk and
capitalization of CCPs.
The assumption of normality clearly does not apply well to the exposures of
many individual derivatives positions, such as individual CDS contracts, which
have heavily skewed and fat-tailed market values due to jump-to-default risk.
Aggregating within the class of all CDS, however, may result in a net exposure
of one entity to another that is substantially less skewed and less fat-tailed,
given the diversiﬁcation across underlying names and the eﬀect of aggregating
across long and short positions. For example, two dealers running large active
matched-book CDS intermediation businesses may have almost no skew in the
distributions of their exposures to each other.
II. Netting Eﬃciency with a CCP
We consider the implications of a CCP for one class of derivatives, say Class K.
Taking the previously described setting, suppose that all positions in Class K
are novated to the same CCP. The expected exposure of entity i to this CCP is
10then
γN = E
[
max
(
∑
j̸=i
X
K
ij ,0
)]
=
√
N   1
2π
σ. (4)
In practice, the exposure of a clearing participant to a CCP has two components.
The ﬁrst part is the direct exposure to the failure of the CCP, as to any other
counterparty. We have explicitly modeled this source of exposure. The second
part of the exposure to the CCP is indirect, in the form of new contributions by
the entity to the CCP guarantee fund that are payable in the event that one or
more other members of the CCP fail. The latter exposure depends in part on the
CCP rules for collateral, guarantee funds, and default management.6 We have
not modeled these indirect exposures. Our measure of netting eﬃciency is thus
likely to be somewhat biased in favor of clearing.
The expected exposure of entity i to the other N   1 entities for the remain-
ing K   1 classes of derivatives is ϕN;K−1. Thus, with a CCP for one class of
derivatives, the average entity expected exposure is
ϕN;K−1 + γN. (5)
Introducing a CCP for this single class of derivatives therefore improves net-
ting eﬃciency if any only if γN + ϕN;K−1 < ϕN;K, which applies if and only
if
K <
N2
4(N   1)
. (6)
Normally, a CCP does not post as much collateral to its counterparties as it
receives from them. Thus, the comparison (4) overstates the beneﬁts of a CCP
from the viewpoint of collateral eﬃciency.
6See Appendices A and B of Duﬃe, Li, and Lubke (2010).
11Based on (4), if there are K = 2 symmetric classes of uncleared derivatives,
then central clearing of one of the classes improves netting eﬃciency if and only if
there are at least 7 entities clearing. If there are 4 symmetric classes of derivatives,
then central clearing of one of the classes improves eﬃciency if and only if there
are at least 15 entities clearing. A CCP is always preferred, in terms of netting
eﬃciency, if it handles all classes of derivatives (which is, in eﬀect, the case of
K = 1).
In Appendix A, we allow for correlations across derivatives classes, and show
that the beneﬁt of introducing central clearing increases with cross-class exposure
correlation. We also point out that counterparties have an incentive to create
exposures with each other that are negatively correlated across asset classes, in
order to hedge their counterparty risks.
It could be argued that the exposure of an entity to a CCP is likely to be of
less concern than its exposure to another entity, because a CCP is likely to be
well regulated, bearing in mind the systemic risk posed by the potential failure of
a CCP. We do not model this “beneﬁt” of a CCP; our average expected exposure
measure weights all counterparty exposures equally. Arguing the other way, the
centrality of a CCP implies that its failure risk could be more toxic than that
of other market participants.7 Likewise, we do not consider this eﬀect. For a
more comprehensive review of policy issues regarding OTC derivatives market
infrastructure, see Duﬃe, Li, and Lubke (2010) and European Central Bank
(2009).
Our measure of netting eﬃciency is based on the total of the expected expo-
sures of an entity to its counterparties. This measure does not consider concentra-
7Examples of clearing-house failures include those of Caisse de Liquidation, Paris, (1974), the Kuala
Lumpur Commodity Clearing House (1983), and the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation (1987).
See Hills, Rule, Parkinson, and Young (1999).
12tion risk. Even putting aside the systemic risk of a CCP caused by its centrality,
a CCP tends to represent a concentration of exposure to its counterparties. In
our simple setting, this is true whenever the number of entities clearing one of
the classes of derivatives is greater than the number of derivatives classes, that
is N > K. Speciﬁcally, the expected exposure of an entity to its CCP, as a
multiple of that entity’s expected exposure to each of its other counterparties,
is
√
(N   1)/(K   1). For instance, if there are N = 10 entities and K = 5
classes of equally risky derivatives, then after novation of positions in one class
to a CCP, the expected exposure of an entity to the CCP is 50% more than its
exposure to any other counterparty.8
A. Derivatives Classes with Diﬀerent Degrees of Risk
We now generalize by considering the netting eﬃciency allowed by the central
clearing of a class of derivatives that may have particularly large exposures, rela-
tive to other classes of derivatives. That is, we now allow the expected exposure
E[max(Xk
ij,0)] of class k to be diﬀerent than that of another class. Our other
assumptions are maintained. A class could include derivatives with more than
one underlying asset type. For example, we could group together all CDS and
all interest rate swaps into a single class for clearing purposes.
Suppose that derivatives in Class K are under consideration for clearing. The
ratio of an entity’s expected exposure with a given counterparty in this asset class
to the total expected exposure with the same counterparty in all other classes
8When comparing instead to the expected exposure to a counterparty that existed before novation to a
CCP, this concentration ratio is
√
(N   1)=K, which is 1.34 in our example. This represents a 34% increase
in concentration due to “clearing,” under our simple assumptions. For N = 20 entities and K = 5 classes of
derivatives, the corresponding increase in concentration is 94%.
13combined is
R =
E
[
max
(
XK
ij ,0
)]
E
[
max
(∑
k<K Xk
ij,0
)]. (7)
For example, if all classes have equal expected exposures, then R = 1/
p
K   1,
using the fact that expected exposures are proportional to standard deviations.
If Class-K exposures are twice as big (in terms of expected exposure) as each
of the other K   1 classes, then R = 2
√
1/(K   1). A calculation analogous to
that shown previously for the symmetric case leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 The introduction of a CCP for a particular class of derivatives
leads to a reduction in average expected counterparty exposures if and only if
R >
2
p
N   1
N   2
, (8)
where R is the ratio of the pre-CCP expected entity-to-entity exposures of the class
in question to the expected entity-to-entity exposure of all other classes combined.
For example, we can take the case of N = 12 entities, the number of entities
that partnered with ICE Trust to create a CCP for clearing credit default swaps.9
Under our assumptions, with N = 12, clearing the derivatives in a particular
class through a CCP improves netting eﬃciency if and only if the fraction R of
an entity’s expected exposure attributable to this class is at least R = 66% of
the total expected exposure of all remaining bilaterally netted classes derivatives.
With N = 26, the cutoﬀ level drops to R = 41.7%. Although the CDS market
poses a large amount of exposure risk, with a total notional market size of roughly
9The participants of the ICE Trust are Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citibank, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of
Scotland, and UBS. See https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ice trust/ICE Trust Participant List.pdf. Pre-
sumably the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America now implies the eﬀect of only N = 12.
14$25 trillion, it would be diﬃcult to make the case that it represents as much as
41.7% of dealer expected exposures in all other “uncleared” derivatives classes
combined.
The Bank for International Settlements provides data on OTC derivatives
exposures of dealers in several major asset classes. The latest available data,
for June 2009, are shown in Table I. Although these data merely show gross
current credit exposures, and therefore do not incorporate the add-on exposure
implications of risky marks to market, they do give a rough indication of the
relative amount of exposure in each of the major underlying asset classes, before
netting and collateral. The eﬀect of bilateral netting reduced the total gross
exposures shown in Table I from $25.4 trillion to $3.7 trillion, but because of the
manner in which these data are collected, the net exposures do not include the
eﬀects of credit default swaps held by non-U.S. dealers.
In light of Proposition 1, it would be hard to base a case for the netting ben-
eﬁts of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to credit default swaps on the
magnitudes of OTC derivatives credit exposures shown in Table I. Credit deriva-
tives account for only about 12% of the total gross exposures. If one assumes that
total counterparty expected exposures of a given dealer are proportional, class
by class, to the gross credit exposures shown in Table I, and that Xk
ij are inde-
pendent across k, the implied ratio R of expected exposures on credit derivatives
to expected exposures on the total of other classes would be about10 19%. This
10To calculate the implied ratio R, denote by Zk the total gross exposure on derivative of class k, for
k = 1;2;:::;K. Assume that the total expected counterparty exposure on class k is a ﬁxed fraction  of
Zk, and that these expected counterparty exposures are independent across k. Without loss of generality,
let class K be centrally cleared while all remaining classes are bilaterally netted. Then the implied ratio of
total expected counterparty exposure on class K to that on classes 1 to K   1 combined is
R =
ZK √∑K 1
k=1 (Zk)2
=
ZK √∑K 1
k=1 Z2
k
:
15Table I: Gross credit exposures in OTC derivative markets.
This table shows gross credit exposures of dealers in OTC derivatives markets by asset
class, counterparty type, and single versus multi-name CDS, as of June 2009. Source: BIS.
Exposure
Asset class ($ billions)
CDS 2,987
Commodity 689
Equity Linked 879
Interest Rate 15,478
Foreign Exchange 2,470
Unallocated 2,868
Total 25,372
Total after netting 3,744
CDS by Counterparty
Dealer to dealer 1,476
Dealer to other ﬁnancial institution 1,332
Dealer to non-ﬁnancial customers 179
Total 2,987
CDS by type
Single name 1,953
Multi-name 1,034
Total 2,987
would in turn imply, from Proposition 1, that a central clearing counterparty
dedicated to CDS reduces average expected counterparty exposures if there are
more than about 120 entities clearing together. After adding to gross exposures
the add-on eﬀect of highly volatile CDS marks to market (relative to other asset
classes), the threshold number of entities necessary to justify a central clearing
counterparty dedicated to CDS is likely to be lower.
Exposures on credit derivatives among dealers have been reduced signiﬁcantly
16since June 2008 due to CDS compression trades.11 According to DTCC DerivServ
data, dealer CDS positions continued to shrink throughout 2008 and 2009. The
total size of the CDS market in terms of notional positions in January 2010 is
about half of mid-2008 levels.12
The data in Table I suggest that there would be a much stronger case for
the joint clearing of CDS and interest rate swaps, which together accounted for
about 73% of the total gross exposures. Indeed, interest rate swaps on their own
represent large enough exposures to justify a dedicated central clearing counter-
party, and a signiﬁcant fraction of interest rate swaps are already cleared through
CCPs.13
Ironically, our model suggests that it is easier to justify the netting beneﬁts
of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to a particular class of derivatives
after a diﬀerent CCP has already been set up for a diﬀerent class of derivatives.
In this sense, “one mistake justiﬁes another.” For example, the threshold size of
the CDS market that justiﬁes the netting beneﬁts of a CDS-dedicated CCP is
lowered once a signiﬁcant fraction of interest rate swaps are cleared.
One could argue that CDS exposure is rather special, because of jump-to-
default risk and because default risk tends to be correlated with systemic risk.
Given the typical practice of daily re-collateralization, the revaluation of CDS
11According to a press release by Markit of July 2, 2008, a compression trade “involves terminating existing
trades and replacing them with a far fewer number of new ‘replacement trades’ which have the same risk
proﬁle and cash ﬂows as the initial portfolio, but with less capital exposure. The initiative, available to both
the U.S. and European CDS markets, will be managed jointly by Creditex and Markit and has the support
of 13 major CDS market participants.” See “Markit and Creditex Announce Launch of Innovative Trade
Compression Platform to Reduce Operational Risk in CDS Market,” July 2, 2008, at www.markit.com.
12See http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php.
13According to a February 3, 2009 press release on its web site, LCH.Clearnet stated that it clears about
50 percent of the OTC global interest rate swap market in a CCP for interest rate swaps. However, Duﬃe,
Li, and Lubke (2010) provides a lower estimate of 35% for dealer-to-dealer clearing based on a survey of
dealers by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. U.S.-based CCPs for interest rate swaps include CME
Cleared Swaps and IDGC. Ledrut and Upper (2007) provide details on the central clearing of interest rate
swaps.
17positions caused by any defaults on a given day would need to be extremely large
in order to build a strong case for separate CDS clearing on the implications
of jump-to-default risk. Our results show that jump-to-default risk is better
reduced through bilateral netting or joint clearing with interest rate swaps, unless
the jump-to-default risk is large relative to that of all other OTC derivatives
exposures. Of the total of $2,987 billion in gross credit exposures shown in Table
I for credit derivatives, $1,034 billion are on multi-name CDS products, mainly
in the form of index contracts such as CDX and iTraxx, which represent equal-
weighted CDS positions in over 100 corporate borrowers. These products have
relatively small jump-to-default risk, in comparison with single-name CDS.
Initially, at least, CCPs dedicated to CDS clearing have restricted attention
to a subset of actively traded CDS. For example, ICE Trust been clearing index
CDS contracts. Some single-name CDS contracts are expected to be cleared in
2010. The smaller the subset of CDS that is cleared, the lower is the netting
eﬃciency oﬀered by central clearing relative to bilateral netting.
The beneﬁt of multilateral netting among a large set of entities is reduced by
a concentration of exposures among a small subset of the entities. For example,
among U.S. banks, data available through the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the
Currency show that, as of the third quarter of 2009, the ﬁve largest derivative
dealers – JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
and Citigroup – account for 95% of total notional credit derivatives positions
held by all U.S. banks. The eﬀective number of U.S. CDS market participants
for purposes of our analysis may not be much more than 5. The proposal for
derivatives clearing becomes relatively more attractive if a single CCP handles
clearing for all standard CDS positions of large global dealers, including those in
Europe and the U.S, and much more attractive if credit derivatives are cleared
18together with interest rate swaps in the same central clearing counterparty.
B. An Example of Exposure Reduction
We now provide a simple illustrative example of exposure reduction under various
clearing scenarios for the six largest U.S. derivative dealers. The notional amounts
of OTC derivatives contracts reported to the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the
Currency14 are shown in Table II. Because we do not have similar data on non-
U.S. banks, we assume there are six other derivative dealers with the same total
notional amounts of derivatives by class, giving a total of N = 12 major dealers
globally.
Let Sk
i be the aggregate (notional) size of the positions of dealer i in derivatives
class k. We suppose that the standard deviation of exposures due to class-k
derivatives is a scaling mk of the associated notional position Sk
i . Here, mk
incorporates both the eﬀect of market value on a typical future date (which
is uncertain from the current perspective), as well as the eﬀect of volatility of
changes in market value between that day and the time by which additional
collateral could partially be collected before the counterparty fails. We also
assume that the exposure of dealer i to dealer j on class k is proportional to Sk
j.
Thus the standard deviation of the pre-collateral pre-clearing exposure of dealer
i to dealer j on derivatives class k is
mkS
k
i
Sk
j ∑
h̸=i Sk
h
. (9)
14The Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency does not provide notional amounts by the underlying
asset classes, such as interest rate, credit, equity, and so on. However, we note that almost all swap contracts
are interest rate swaps, and that almost all credit derivatives are credit default swaps. For that reason we
use the notional amounts of swaps contracts as proxies for those of interest rate swaps, and the notional
amounts of credit derivatives as proxies for those of CDS.
19Table II: Notional sizes of six largest U.S. derivative dealers.
This table shows the notional sizes of six largest U.S. derivative dealer banks, published by
the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, as of 2009 Q3. The identities of the banks
are omitted.
Forwards Swaps Options Credit Total
Bank 1 8177 51203 10059 6376 75815
Bank 2 8984 49478 5918 5590 69970
Bank 3 1651 31521 6980 5762 45914
Bank 4 5718 24367 4064 5482 39631
Bank 5 5536 16375 6384 2764 31059
Bank 6 1198 2192 477 268 4135
Total 31264 175136 33882 26242 266524
We let αk be the fraction of notional positions in derivatives of class k that are
centrally cleared. Keeping our normality and independence assumptions, we have
X
k
ij  N

0,
(
mkS
k
i
Sk
j ∑
h̸=i Sk
h
)2
. (10)
The expected exposure of Dealer i to a CCP dedicated to class-k derivatives is
thus
E
[
max
(
∑
j̸=i
α
kX
k
ij,0
)]
=
1
p
2π
α
kmkS
k
i



∑
j̸=i(Sk
j )2
(∑
j̸=i Sk
j
)2



1
2
. (11)
The expected exposure of Dealer i to Dealer j on all uncleared positions is
E
[
max
(
K ∑
k=1
(1   α
k)X
k
ij,0
)]
=
1
p
2π


K ∑
k=1
(
(1   α
k)mkS
k
i
Sk
j ∑
j̸=i Sk
j
)2

1
2
.
(12)
Table III shows the dealers’ pre-collateral expected exposures under various
clearing approaches. These exposures are shown as multiples of total exposures
20Table III: Expected counterparty exposures under various clearing approaches.
This table shows the expected counterparty derivatives exposures of dealers under various
clearing approaches, as multiples of total exposures when all classes are bilaterally netted.
“Mult.” refers to the case of multiple CCPs, each clearing one class of derivatives. “Same”
refers to the case of a single CCP clearing all derivative classes considered. The estimates
are based on N = 12 dealers, the six dealers of Table II and six others with the same
exposures class-by-class. The standard deviation scaling mk for non-interest-rate-swap
derivatives is assumed to be three times that for interest rate derivatives.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fractions cleared on CCP(s)
Forwards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4
Swaps 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4
Credit 0 1 1 0.75 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Number of CCP - Same Mult. Same Same Mult. Same Mult. Same
Total exposures as fractions of exposures without CCPs
Bank 1 1 1.05 1.09 1.03 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.79 0.63
Bank 2 1 1.05 1.09 1.03 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.76 0.62
Bank 3 1 1.05 1.10 1.02 0.88 0.85 0.78 0.76 0.61
Bank 4 1 1.04 1.10 1.01 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.80 0.63
Bank 5 1 1.05 1.09 1.03 1.00 1.02 0.97 0.86 0.69
Bank 6 1 1.04 1.06 1.03 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.83 0.70
Total (ratio) 1 1.05 1.09 1.03 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.79 0.63
for the case in which all derivatives are bilaterally netted. For this example, we
use a standard-deviation scaling mk for non-interest-rate-swap derivatives that
is three times that for interest rate derivatives.15
Relative to the no-clearing base case, the introduction of a CCP that clears
100% of credit derivatives actually increases market-wide expected exposures by
15From BIS data as of June 2009, the market value of interest rate swaps is roughly 3.5% of the notional
amounts. The market value of all the other derivatives classes combined is about 5.9% of the notional
amounts. These numbers suggest a ratio of roughly 1.67 to 1 for the current valuations of non-interest-rate-
swaps to interest rate swaps, per unit notional. We scale up from 1.67 to 3 in order to allow for the volatility
of changes in market value between the time of valuation and the time by which additional collateral could
be received before a potential default.
21about 5% in this setting (Column 2), as suggested by our theory. If a CDS-
dedicated CCP clears 75% of CDS, then expected exposures are about 3% higher
than for the case of fully bilateral netting (Column 4).
If we divide CDS positions into two classes, say “European” and “U.S.,” of
equal total notional sizes, then clearing the U.S. and European CDS separately
increases expected exposures by 9%, relative to bilateral netting (Column 3).
Estimated expected exposures are reduced by about 10%, relative to bilateral
netting, if 75% of interest rate swaps are centrally cleared (Column 5). Morgan
Stanley (2009) forecasts the clearing of about 75% of dealer-to-dealer interest rate
swaps and CDS in the next 2-3 years. With this 75% level of interest-rate-swap
clearing, adding a CDS-only CCP has a negligible eﬀect on expected exposures
(Column 6). If, however, 75% of CDS and interest rate swaps are cleared by the
same CCP, then expected exposures are reduced by 17%, compared to bilateral
netting (Column 7).
Clearing a moderately large fraction of all classes of derivatives in the same
CCP reduces average estimated exposures by 37% (Column 9). This high degree
of netting eﬃciency is not achieved if the same amounts are cleared centrally but
separately (Column 8).
Figure 1 illustrates total expected exposures under various clearing approaches.
We ﬁx the fraction of interest rate swaps that are centrally cleared to be 35%,
the estimate of clearing obtained in a dealer survey conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.16 When CDS and interest rate swaps are cleared
together in the same CCP, the reduction in exposure is positive and convex in
the cleared fraction of CDS. Total expected exposures are strictly higher if CDS
are cleared separately from interest rate swaps.
16See Duﬃe, Li, and Lubke (2010).
22Figure 1: Total expected exposures under various clearing approaches.
This ﬁgure shows the total expected exposures under various clearing approaches, as a
function of the cleared fraction of CDS. In all cases, we assume that 35% of interest rate
swaps (IRS) are cleared. In the case of two CDS-dedicated CCPs, we assume that the total
notional sizes of CDS cleared on the two CDS CCPs are equal.
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Our numerical results highlight the trade-oﬀ between bilateral and multilat-
eral netting. Our results indicate that counterparty exposures can be reduced
signiﬁcantly if the same CCP jointly clears multiple classes of derivatives. Joint
clearing also reduces margin requirements. Singh (2009) estimates that if two
thirds of all OTC derivatives are cleared through CCPs using current CCP ap-
proaches, then roughly $400 billion in additional clearing margin and guarantee
funds will be needed.
23III. Netting Eﬃciency with Multiple CCPs
In this section, going beyond the illustrative estimates of Section 3.3, we prove
a general result on the loss of netting eﬃciency caused by dedicating diﬀerent
CCPs to each of several classes of derivatives, as opposed to the joint clearing of
various classes of derivatives in a single CCP.
We drop our normality and symmetry assumptions, and allow for an arbitrary
joint distribution of Xk
ij. We suppose that C of the K classes of derivatives
are centrally cleared, while the remaining K   C classes are bilaterally netted.
Without loss of generality, classes 1,2,...,C are cleared through CCPs. The
expected exposure of Entity i on uncleared derivatives is
ϕi;N;K−C = E
[
max
(
K ∑
k=C+1
∑
j̸=i
X
k
ij,0
)]
. (13)
With a single CCP that clears all of the ﬁrst C classes, the total expected exposure
of Entity i is
Ui = E
[
max
(
C ∑
k=1
∑
j̸=i
X
k
ij,0
)]
+ ϕi;N;K−C. (14)
With the separate clearing of the ﬁrst C classes of derivatives, the expected
exposure of Entity i to the C diﬀerent CCPs is instead
ˆ Ui = E
[
C ∑
k=1
max
(
∑
j̸=i
X
k
ij,0
)]
+ ϕi;N;K−C
 E
[
max
(
C ∑
k=1
∑
j̸=i
X
k
ij,0
)]
+ ϕi;N;K−C
= Ui, (15)
using the convexity of max() and Jensen’s inequality. That is, each entity has
24higher expected counterparty exposure with multiple CCPs than with a single
CCP. This result formalizes the intuition of the example given in Section 3.3.
Proposition 2 For an arbitrary joint distribution of bilateral exposures (Xk
ij),
each entity’s total expected counterparty exposure with C > 1 CCPs clearing
derivative classes separately is greater than or equal to its total expected exposures
with a single CCP clearing all C classes jointly.
Similarly, any increase in joint clearing – that is, any reduction in the number
C of CCPs obtained by combining diﬀerent classes of derivatives clearing into
the same CCP – reduces expected exposures. These comparisons are strict under
non-degeneracy assumptions on the joint distribution of
(
Xk
ij
)
.
In Appendix B, we examine the case of separate CCPs for two groups of mar-
ket participants. We show that whenever introducing a unique CCP for all market
participants strictly reduces counterparty exposures, it is always more eﬃcient
to have one CCP than separate CCPs for each group of market participants.
IV. Conclusion
We show that the central clearing of one class of derivatives such as credit default
swaps may reduce netting eﬃciency, leading to higher expected counterparty
exposures and collateral demands. When multiple derivatives classes are cleared,
it is always more eﬃcient to clear them on the same CCP rather than on diﬀerent
CCPs. An obvious policy recommendation is a move toward the joint clearing of
standard interest rate swaps and credit default swaps in the same clearing house.
25Appendices
A Cross-Class Exposure Correlation
We now allow for the possibility that derivatives exposures are correlated across
asset classes. For simplicity, we suppose that the correlation ρ between Xk
ij and
Xm
ij does not depend on i,j, or the particular pair (k,m) of asset classes. (We
continue to assume joint normality, symmetry, and equal variances.)
For entity-to-entity exposures, it would be reasonable to assume that ρ is small
in magnitude, bearing in mind that this correlation depends in part on whether
the exposure between i and j in one particular derivative contract is likely to be
of the same sign as that of its exposure in another. For pairs of dealers with large
matched-book operations, one might anticipate that ρ is close to zero.
The average total expected exposure without a CCP is
ϕN;K =
1
p
2π
σ(N   1)
√
K(1 + (K   1)ρ). (16)
With a CCP for Class-K positions only, the average total expected exposure
is
γN + ϕN;K−1 =
1
p
2π
σ
(p
N   1 + (N   1)
√
(K   1)(1 + (K   2)ρ)
)
. (17)
The reduction in average expected exposure due to the introduction of a CCP
for one class of derivatives is therefore
θ(N,K) = ϕN;K   (γN + ϕN;K−1). (18)
26Proposition 3 The introduction of a CCP for one class of derivatives reduces
the average total expected exposure of an entity if and only of
θ(N,K) > 0 , βK >
1
p
N   1
, (19)
where
βK =
1 + 2ρ(K   1)
√
K(1 + (K   1)ρ) +
√
(K   1)(1 + (K   2)ρ)
. (20)
This result follows from the fact that
θ(N,K) =
1
p
2π
σ(N 1)
(√
K(1 + (K   1)ρ)  
√
(K   1)(1 + (K   2)ρ)  
1
p
N   1
)
.
(21)
Rearranging terms, we have the result.
Figure 2 shows the mean reduction in average total expected exposure for
various combinations of N,K, and ρ. (The reduction is scaled to the case of
σ = 1.) Increasing the correlation between positions increases the relative netting
beneﬁts of a CCP, because between-entity netting is not as beneﬁcial if cross-class
exposures are positively correlated.17 Indeed, one can show that
∂θ
∂ρ
=
1
p
2π
σ(N   1)
1
2
[ p
K(K   1)
√
1 + (K   1)ρ
 
p
K   1(K   2)
√
1 + (K   2)ρ
]
> 0. (22)
Because dealers may have a tendency, especially when their counterparties
are distressed, of entering derivatives trades that oﬀset exposures arising in other
classes of derivatives, we believe that extra emphasis should be placed on the
case of negative ρ.
17For a ﬁxed number N of entities, as the number K of derivatives classes gets large, K converges to
p
,
for  > 0. Thus, in this sense of increasingly many classes of derivatives, or more generally as the expected
exposure in the class to be centrally cleared becomes small relative to that in other classes of derivatives, a
CCP is asymptotically eﬃcient if and only if  > 1=(N   1):
27Figure 2: Reductions in average expected exposures with a single CCP.
This ﬁgure shows the reductions (θ) in average expected exposures associated with clearing
one class of derivatives with a single central clearing counterparty, based on N entities, K
classes of derivatives, and a cross-class exposure correlation of ρ. The reductions are scaled
for the case of σ = 1.
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We calculate, treating N as though a real number, that
∂θ(N,K)
∂N
=
1
p
2π
σ
(
βK  
1
2
p
N   1
)
(23)
∂2θ(N,K)
∂N2 =
σ
p
2π
1
4(N   1)3=2 > 0. (24)
28The convexity of θ(N,K) with respect to N is evident from Figure 2.
B Separate CCPs by Entity Groups
In this appendix we consider the cost of having two CCPs, each dedicated to a
particular group of entities, for the same class of derivatives. This separation of
CCPs is diﬀerent from that in Section III.. We return to our original assumption
of independence of exposures across classes of exposures. We assume that the
entities are partitioned into two groups for separate clearing, Group A with M
entities and Group B with N   M entities. We allow for the possibility that
entities within a group have higher exposures with each other than they do with
entities in the other group. Speciﬁcally, if entities i and j are in diﬀerent groups,
while i and n are in the same group, we let
q =
E[max(Xk
ij,0)]
E[max(Xk
in,0)]
(25)
be the ratio of cross-group expected exposures to within-group expected expo-
sures. We will always assume, naturally, that q  1. Our assumptions are other-
wise as before.
With the introduction of CCPs for Class-K derivatives, one for each group,
we suppose that all entities continue to bilaterally net exposures on the remaining
K   1 classes, that they clear Class-K derivatives within their own group, and
that they continue to bilterally net exposures on Class-K derivatives with those
counterparties that are not in their own group. The total expected exposure of
29an entity in Group A, for instance, is therefore
ϕM;K−1+qϕN−M+1;K+γM =
1
p
2π
σ
(
(M   1)
p
K   1 + q(N   M)
p
K +
p
M   1
)
.
(26)
For M = N/2, with N even, the average total expected entity exposure (in both
groups) is
1
2
(ϕM;K−1 + qϕN−M+1;K + γM + ϕN−M;K−1 + qϕM+1;K + γN−M)
=
1
p
2π
σ
[(
N
2
  1
)p
K   1 +
qN
2
p
K +
√
N
2
  1
]
.
Similarly, with only one CCP, the average total expected entity exposure is
1
p
2π
σ
[(
N(1 + q)
2
  1
)p
K   1 +
√
N(1 + q2)
2
  1
]
. (27)
We let Θ(N,K,M) be the reduction in expected exposures associated with
two CCPs, over using one CCP for the same class of derivatives for all entities.
For the case of M = N/2, we calculate that
Θ(N,K,N/2) =
1
p
2π
σ
[
 
qN
2(
p
K +
p
K   1)
 
√
N
2
  1 +
√
N(1 + q2)
2
  1
]
.
(28)
For M = N/2, having two CCPs is more eﬃcient than having one CCP if and
only if
Θ(N,K,N/2) > 0 ,
p
K+
p
K   1 >
1
q
(√
N
2
  1 +
√
N(1 + q2)
2
  1
)
. (29)
30Without any CCP, the expected exposure is
1
p
2π
σ
(
N(1 + q)
2
  1
)p
K. (30)
Provided M = N/2, a unique CCP for all Class-K derivatives reduces average
expected exposure, relative to no CCP, by
δ(N,K,q) =
1
p
2π
σ
[(
N(1 + q)
2
  1
)
(
p
K  
p
K   1)  
√
N(1 + q2)
2
  1
]
.
(31)
Having a single CCP for all entities improves eﬃciency, relative to having none,
if and only if
δ(N,K,q) > 0 ,
p
K +
p
K   1 <
N(1+q)
2   1
√
N(1+q2)
2   1
. (32)
Comparing (10) and (11), for equally sized groups of entities, one can show
that whenever introducing a unique CCP for all entities strictly improves eﬃ-
ciency, it is always more eﬃcient to have one CPP than to have separate CCPs
for each group of entities. This implication can also be observed in Figure 3.
31Figure 3: Reductions in average total expected exposure allowed by having two CCPs.
The top panel shows the reductions (Θ) in average total expected exposures allowed by
having two CCPs, one for each group of entities, relative to having one CCP for all entities.
The bottom panel shows the reductions (δ) in average total expected exposures allowed by
having one CCP relative to none (fully bilateral netting of exposures). The reductions are
normalized by taking σ = 1.
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